We consider se ings in which we wish to incentivize myopic agents (such as Airbnb landlords, who may emphasize short-term pro ts and property safety) to treat arriving clients fairly, in order to prevent overall discrimination against individuals or groups. We model such se ings in both classical and contextual bandit models in which the myopic agents maximize rewards according to current empirical averages, but are also amenable to exogenous payments that may cause them to alter their choices. Our notion of fairness asks that more quali ed individuals are never (probabilistically) preferred over less quali ed ones [8] .
INTRODUCTION
Recent uses of machine learning to make decisions of consequence for individual citizens (such as credit, employment and criminal sentencing) have led to concerns about the potential for these techniques to be discriminatory or unfair ( [1] , [4] , [2] ). Existing research has emphasized discriminatory outcomes originating from biases encoded into the data sets on which algorithms are trained. 1 In this paper, we consider a di erent source of unfairness in a stochastic bandit se ing.
e key friction we examine is when a forward-looking principal concerned with fairness (such as a regulator or technology platform) is not the one directly making the choices. Instead, a sequence of myopic agents are making the choices. To prevent unfair choices by these agents, the principal 1 For example, Boston's Street Bump program, which uses smartphones to determine where road repairs are needed, results in certain areas being underserved because of the sparsity of smartphones traversing them ( [12] ). may o er targeted monetary rewards to agents to incentivize them to make di erent choices than they would have in the absence of such payments. Our concern in this paper is how much the principal needs to be prepared to pay in order to incentivize fair decisions by myopic agents.
To help x ideas and motivate our problem, consider a challenge faced by peer-to-peer (P2P) platforms such as Prosper (P2P lending) or Airbnb (P2P short-stay housing). e platform cannot dictate to their users who to extend loans or rent to. Nevertheless, it may wish to ensure the choices its users make are fair, either to avoid criticism, 2 or to comply with existing regulations. P2P lending, for example, is subject to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). One provision of the Act is a requirement that lenders furnish reasons for adverse lending decisions. is obligation falls on the shoulders of the platform, and is challenging to discharge because the platform aggregates the decisions of many di erent lenders. 3 In our model, an agent arrives at each period and must choose amongst a set of available alternatives. (For instance, the agent might be a lender on Prosper choosing to whom they will grant a loan, or an Airbnb host choosing which guest to accept.) We model this as a choice of which arm to pull in a stochastic bandit se ing. We consider both the classic and contextual bandit cases. In the classic se ing, each arm represents an individual, who will over time repeatedly be considered for service. In the contextual se ing, each arm represents a group, and individual members of that group are represented by contexts (i.e. sets of individual features) which change at each round. A stochastic reward from the pull of an arm models the uncertain payo associated with serving an individual (i.e. extending a loan, or having the individual rent). Each agent is myopic in the sense that they are occasional users of this platform, and thus care only about their current expected payo . Because of myopia, the agent chooses the arm with the highest empirical mean in the classical case, and the context with the highest predicted reward according to a xed one-shot learning procedure known to the principal (e.g. ordinary least squares regression, or ridge regression). Each agent is limited to pulling a single arm to model their limited resources (e.g., they may only have the funds to grant one loan, or host one guest on any particular night), and of course this simpli es our analysis. e platform, motivated by a need for "accountability, " would like to be fair. Our formal de nition of fairness (Joseph et al. [8] ) may be found in Section 2, and can be informally described as follows: Suppose an auditor knew the expected reward of each arm (or more generally, in the contextual case, of each context), and looked back at the platform's decisions. Fairness requires that a worse individual was never favored over a be er individual. More precisely, if a platform is fair, then on any day t, the probability p x that the agent pulls arm x is such that if the expected reward of x is at least that of x , then p x ≥ p x . Fairness as de ned in this paper does not address inequities "outside the model." For example, if one group has lower expected payo for every context than another, perhaps due to historical inequities, and there are no additional features available to the learning algorithm, our notion of fairness permits the agent to favor the higher expected group. In this sense our fairness notion is aligned with (apparent) meritocracy.
Intuitively, there are two impediments to fairness in this model. First, neither the platform nor the agents know the distribution of rewards of each arm. If these were known, the problem would be trivial: it would be both fair and agent-optimal to always pull the arm with highest expected reward. Second, the agents are myopic -they have no incentive to directly invest in fairness or learning.
We examine whether it is possible for the platform, herea er called the principal, to incentivize the agents to make fair choices by o ering the agent payments for selecting particular arms. ese
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payments can be randomized. Because the agents behave identically in our model (they are all myopic), we treat them as if they are a single myopic entity, whom we term the agent. We investigate how much information a principal needs to incentivize fair behavior. Characterizing the information requirements is important, since sometimes the principal may be an external regulator or other entity tasked with oversight without the full information available to the platform. At one extreme, called partial information, we suppose the principal observes only which decisions were made by the agent in each of the previous rounds but not the rewards. In the P2P context, rewards might be unobservable because the reward an agent experiences is a function of both observed characteristics of the borrower or renter and a private type of the agent. At the other extreme of full information, the principal has the same information as the agent. We ask each of these questions in both the classic and linear contextual bandits se ings. In the classic case, individual i is be er than individual j if the mean of distribution i is higher than that of distribution j. In the contextual case, individual i on day t is represented by a set of features, or a context x t i , and that individual's expected reward is de ned as f i (x t i ) for some f i ∈ C. Table 1 summarizes our results for characterizing the cost of incentivizing fair play in myopic agents. Informally, we show a stark separation: in the partial information model, any fair payment scheme must cost Ω(T ); while in the full information model there are payment schemes which cost O (d √ k 3 T ). In both the classic and contextual se ings, the full information upper bounds e ectively incentivize the agent to play known fair algorithms. e lower bounds for the partial information model look somewhat di erent. For the classic se ing, our lower bound simply shows that the rst round at which the principal doesn't o er a payment of 1 will be unfair with constant probability; for the contextual se ing, every round must either be unfair or o er Ω(1) payment.
Our Results
We additionally show that in partial information model, the classic problem is somewhat easier in two cases. When there are only 2 arms, we give a simple payment scheme that only incurs a cost of O ( √ T ) and guarantees with high probability that the agent is fair at every round. Even when k ≥ 3, a principal who is allowedÕ (k 2 ) unfair rounds can design a payment scheme which costs onlyÕ ( √ k 3 T ). 4 In the full information model, we exhibit a payment scheme for the principal which, with high probability, is fair in every round, and has costÕ ( √ k 3 T ). It is interesting to observe that all our payment schemes that guarantee fairness (either in each period, or except at a constant number of periods) and achieve sublinear costs also induce the agent to play so as to experience sublinear regret. If we think of sub-linear regret as a proxy for e ciency, our full information results say we can achieve both e ciency and fairness with subsides that grow 4 In other words, we show that by allowing a constant number of unfair rounds, independent of T , one can achieve sublinear costs. slowly over time. Under certain conditions, this is also possible in the partial information se ing, which does not require the principal to "open the books" of the agent.
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Related Work
Our work is closely related to the literature on incentivizing experimentation in bandit se ings. In these papers, a sequence of agents arrives one at a time and each is allowed to select an arm to pull. Each agent "lives" for one period and therefore pulls the arm that has the highest current estimated payo given the history. e agents' myopia means that they do not explore su ciently and the patient principal must encourage it. In this context, Frazier et al. [6] explore the achievable set between the monetary rewards the principal must pay to incentivize exploration and the time discounted expected reward to the principal. In this paper the history of actions and outcomes is observed by the principal and there is, therefore, no examination of what happens with limited information. More importantly, there is no consideration of fairness, which is our primary interest.
A di erent string of papers does not explicitly allow for monetary payments, but instead the principal discloses information about past agents' realized rewards to the future agents, see e.g. Kremer et al. [9] , a more general exploration in Mansour et al. [10, 11] , or an analytical solution in a continous time Poisson bandit se ing by Che and Horner [3] and the same in a discrete time se ing in Papanastasiou et al. [13] . e key point of departure for our work is that for us, the principal is not explicitly interested in the long term reward of the agent, but is instead interested in promoting "fairness" (although this will incidentally have the property of increasing long-term reward of the agent by encouraging experimentation).
Joseph et al. [8] originally proposed our de nition of contextual fairness. ey consider the tradeo s between requiring this form of fairness and achieving no-regret in both classic and contextual bandit se ings. is notion was also employed in Joseph et al. [7] , when specialized to the linear contextual bandits case.
PRELIMINARIES
A principal faces a sequence of homogeneous myopic agents, each operating in a contextual bandit se ing. For simplicity, we view the agents as a single agent repeatedly making myopic choices.
Contextual Bandits
Let {k} refer to a set of arms. In each round t ∈ [T ], an adversary reveals to the agent a context x t j ∈ X, where X is the common domain of contexts, for each arm j ∈ [k].
Fix some class C of functions of the form f : X → [0, 1]. Associated with each arm j is a function f j ∈ C, unknown to both the agent and the principal. 5 . An agent who chooses an arm j in period t with context is x t j receives a stochastic reward r t j ∼ F
Remark 1 (Linear Contextual Bandits). e results in this paper which involve contexts are for the case where the set of contexts X = {x ∈ [0, 1] d : ||x || ≤ 1} for some number d > 0, and
Remark 2 (Classic Bandits). e classic bandits problem is a special case of the contextual bandits problem where the set of possible contexts is a singleton. en F · j = F j and r t j ∼ F j . 5 O en, the contextual bandit problem is de ned so that there is a single function f associated with all of the arms. Our model is only more general. Session 5b: Information Games EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA
In the running example of P2P lending, X represents possible pro les of a ributes that a lender can observe about a potential borrower. e exact relationship between a pro le of a ributes at time t, denoted x t j , and the expected reward earned from extending a loan to a borrower with this pro le is f j (x t j ); this functional form is unknown to the lender, the platform, and the agent.
The Myopic Agent and the Principal
In each period t, the principal can o er a vector of payments p t ∈ k + to the agent. Here p t i is to be interpreted as the monetary incentive the agent receives from the principal if they selects arm i on top of any reward that would accrue from the arm itself.
We assume the agent makes myopic choices facing empirical estimates of the reward from each arm (we describe how these empirical estimates are constructed momentarily). We useμ t i to denote the empirical estimated reward for selecting arm i in round t. When the agent receives a proposed subsidy vector p t ∼ γ t (·), they choose the arm which maximizes the sum of empirical expected reward and payment, i.e. chooses i t ∈ arg max i (μ t i + p t i ). is is the sense in which the agent is myopic-they maximize (their estimate of) today's net reward plus payment, with no concern for the future. Note that we assume that rewards are expressed in monetary terms, i.e. that they are directly comparable to o ered payments.
For concreteness and without loss of generality, we x a tie-breaking rule-if M = arg max i (μ t i + p t i ) contains multiple elements, the agent chooses uniformly at random amongst the members of M that also maximize payment, i.e. from the set arg max i ∈M p t i . 6 e principal experiences cost p t i t at round t, and total cost T t =1 p t i t over the course of T rounds. e payments o ered by the principal, and the empirical estimates of the agent, depend on what they know about past choices and outcomes. We de ne these next.
Information and Histories
e agent will, in any period t, recall history h t ∈ X k × k
is is a record of the previous t − 1 rounds experienced by the agent: t − 1 4-tuples encoding the realization of the contexts for each arm in a given period, the payments the principal o ered, the arm chosen, and the realized reward observed.
In the linear contextual case, letθ t i represent an estimate of the linear model θ i based on the history h t (this could, for example, be the ordinary least-squares or regularized ridge regression estimator -the important thing is that whichever method is used is known to the principal). e myopic decision maker, at day t, when facing contexts x t 1 , . . . , x t k will have empirical estimated
In the classic se ing,
that is, it represents the empirical average for the set of previous rewards observed from arm i in previous rounds. Note that during the rst several rounds, the myopic reward estimatesμ t i are not necessarily de ned, e.g. if in the classic se ing, the agent has not yet observed any rewards from arm i, or if in the linear contextual case, the agent has not observed su ciently many reward/context pairs to uniquely de ne the OLS estimator. To get around this issue, we assume that the agent has previously observed su ciently many observations from each arm to make these estimates well 6 Our results do not depend in any important way on the particulars of the tie-breaking rule-we chose this one to simplify Session 5b: Information Games EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA de ned -i.e. at least one observation per arm in the classic case, and observations corresponding to contexts that combined form a full rank matrix in the linear case. We consider two information models for the principal. In the full information model, the principal observes everything the agent observes, i.e. there is no information asymmetry between the two. In the partial information model, the principal observes neither the contexts faced by the agents, nor the realized reward of the arm the agent pulled. We will denote this by
e principal's information scheme is a function of the information they have.
In what follows, we de ne various notions of performance of algorithm. is is without loss: the payments that the principal o ers, and the resulting choices made by the agents choices, taken together, can be thought of as an algorithm making choices in a stochastic bandit se ing.
Fairness and Regret
A standard method for measuring the performance of a bandit algorithm is to measure its regret.
, selecting the arm with highest expected reward in each period would be optimal. Fix an algorithm A and let π t be the distribution over arms at round t of the algorithm: the regret of A is the di erence between the reward of the optimal policy, and the reward of the agent:
We say that A satis es regret bound
We denote by π t j |h t the probability that A chooses arm j a er observing contexts x t in period t, given h t . For economy, we will o en drop the superscript t on the history when referring to the distribution over arms: π t j |h π t j |h t . We now de ne what it means for an algorithm A to be fair in a particular round t. Informally, this will mean that A will play arm i with higher probability than arm j in round t only if i has higher true expected reward than j in round t.
De nition 2.1 (Round Fairness). Fix some history h t . Recall π t j |h t is the probability that A plays arm j in round t given the history h t . We will say A is fair in round t if, for any context x t , for all pairs of arms j, j ∈
. Similarly, a payment scheme is fair in round t if the selection by the myopic agent under the payment distribution is fair. Remark 3. When this de nition is specialized to the classic (noncontextual) case, the reward distributions do not vary with time, i.e. F t j = F j for all t. us, "noncontextual" fairness reduces to guaranteeing that if arm i is played with higher probability than arm j, it must be that the average reward drawn from distribution F i is higher than the average reward drawn from distribution F j .
Remark 4. To be clear about this de nition in the partial information model, and what we mean by probabilities: note that the "algorithm" has access to h t at the beginning of time t. By this we mean that, the principal has access to h t . e principal then o ers payments to the agent, possibly randomizing. e agent sees the full history h t , and the realized payments drawn from a distribution, and makes a choice. e principal's randomization, and then, if there are ties, the agent's randomization in period t, can be amalgamated into a net probability of each arm being selected in period t a er history h t . ese are the π 's that the de nition refers to.
We now introduce a notion of fairness which holds at every round with high probability over the history of observed rewards.
De nition 2.2 (Contextual Fairness). A(·)
is fair if, for any input δ ∈ (0, 1), for all sequences of contexts, x 1 , . . . , x t and all reward distributions F t 1 , . . . , F t k , with probability at least 1 − δ over the realization of the history h, for all rounds t ∈ [T ], A(δ ) is fair in round t.
Contextual fairness, introduced in Joseph et al. [8] , formalizes the idea that highly quali ed individuals should be treated at least as well as less quali ed individuals. Here, an individual's quali cation is measured in terms of their expected reward for A. If two individuals have di erent pro les (or contexts) but generate the same expected reward to the learner, this de nition enforces that both be played with equal probability every round. We also introduce a relaxation of contextual fairness, which allows for an algorithm to have some number of unfair rounds.
De nition 2.3 ( -Contextual Fairness). A(δ )
is -fair if, for any input δ ∈ (0, 1), for all sequences of contexts, and all reward distributions, with probability at least 1 − δ over the realization of the history h, for all but rounds t ∈ [T ], A(δ ) is fair in round t.
Our principal is willing to incentivize the agent's behavior to ensure contextual fairness (and, incidentally, low regret). We investigate what subsidy schemes incentivize fair choices by a myopic agent, and the cumulative cost of such subsidies. We show this answer depends upon the kind of information the principal has access to: incentivizing fair play with partial information is in general very expensive, while incentivizing fair play under full information need not be so.
A PRINCIPAL WITH PARTIAL INFORMATION CANNOT ENSURE T FAIR ROUNDS
In this section, we give a lower bound on the total payments needed in the partial information se ing to ensure contextual fairness in every round. In fact, we don't even need to move to the contextual case: this section focuses on the classic bandit se ing (where the context x t j is invariant with respect to t for each arm j). We show that in the partial information se ing, any principal who incentivizes a myopic agent to satisfy contextual fairness in each round must incentivize uniformly random play in each of the T rounds, which has cumulative cost Ω(T ).
ere is an instance such that any fair payment scheme in the partial information model must, with probability 1 − δ , (where δ is the fairness parameter passed to the principal) spend Ω(T ) in payments over T rounds and incur regret Ω(T ). e lower bound proceeds from the following idea: at the rst round, the principal has no information about what the instance is. Hence, in order to guarantee fairness against all instances, they must proceed cautiously and use a payment scheme that is able to induce uniformly random play (the only distribution that is fair for all instances) for every possible realization of empirical means. Because empirical means can range between 0 and 1, this will cost 1. However, because this payment distribution (by design) induces identical behavior on every possible instance, it does not allow the principal to learn anything about the instance. us, in every round before which fair play has been guaranteed, the principal has the same informational disadvantage. By induction, therefore, they must induce uniformly random play at every round, at a cost of 1 per round.
We show that fairness at every round, against all instances is equivalent to the payment scheme in each round being what we term peaked. A peaked payment rule is one that can always incentivize the play of some arm regardless of the empirical means the myopic agent currently has. is is equivalent to saying that there is some arm i ∈ [k] for which p i ≥ p i + 1 for all i i. is will imply the payment scheme must spend Ω(1) in each round to incentivize fair play, or Ω(T ) in total. Observation 1. If a principal uses a peaked distribution D in a round, they learn nothing about the instance the agent faces from the agent's play in that round. P . By De nition 3.2, every payment scheme drawn from D is peaked. In other words, for every p ∼ D: there is some i such that p i ≥ max i i p i + 1. us, the myopic agent will choose i when presented with p regardless of the instance the agent faces. e main idea behind eorem 3.1 is in proving that any fair payment scheme must be peaked in every round. Technically, we use the fact that the principal learns nothing about the instance from a peaked distribution to allow us freedom to design a lower bound instance as a function of the rst distribution D t deployed by the principal that is not peaked. Because this distribution, by virtue of being the rst non-peaked distribution, cannot be a function of the underlying instance, we are unconstrained in our ability to tailor the instance as a function of D t . We then show this instance forces an unfair round for D t ; we can conclude that with probability 1 − δ , the principal must never deploy any distribution over payments that is not peaked. L 3.3. For any fairness parameter δ , a fair payment scheme must with probability 1 − δ generate a sequence of payment distributions D 1 , . . . , D T such that each D t is peaked.
We now conclude the proof of eorem 3.1 before presenting the proof of Lemma 3.3.
P
. Lemma 3.3 implies that a fair payment scheme must with probability 1 − δ generate T peaked payment distributions. Since max i p i ≥ max j i p j + 1, andμ t i ∈ [0, 1] for all i, the payment scheme's largest payment is always at least 1, and is always accepted. us, the myopic agent will receive a payment of at least 1 in every round, for a total cost of Ω(T ).
To prove the regret of this payment scheme may be Ω(T ) on some instances, consider each of the k instances in which one arm has mean 1 and the remaining k −1 arms have mean 0. By Observation 1, the principal has no information about which of these instances is realized. erefore to be to be fair with respect to all of these instances, each arm must be assigned the largest payment with equal probability, which induces uniformly random play amongst all k arms, Ω(1) regret per round, and cumulative regret Ω(T ).
We now present the proof of the main lemma for this section: that in order for a payment distribution to be fair, it must be peaked. Informally, we rst show that any fair payment distribution must be "invariant under permutation": any coordinate i should have have an equal probability of having the largest payment, and have an equal probability of j being the second-largest payment with margin c, for each value of j and c. We then show in the rst round t at which the payment distribution is unpeaked, D t is unfair for some instance I constructed as a function of D t . P L 3.3. We consider some round t. Suppose that for every round t < t, the payment distribution D t was peaked. If the payment distribution D t = D at round t is fair, we show that it too must be peaked. Observe that by Observation 1, D must be de ned independently of the underlying instance I , and because fairness is de ned in the worst case over instances, we continue to have complete freedom in choosing I .
We rst claim that in round t, if D is fair, for any two distinct i, i , ∈ [k] and any c ∈ [0, 1], that where µ i = µ i = 1 − c, and all other arms (of which there is at least 1) have means µ j = 1. Suppose further that the distribution over i's reward is deterministic point mass at 1 − c, whereas i 's reward distribution yields reward 1 − c + ϵ with probability 1 2 and 1 − c − ϵ with probability 1 2 . en, with probability at least 1 4 ,μ i <μ i . 7 us, with probability 1 4 over the history of rewards observed, i wins with higher probability than i , since i wins whenever i's payment is the largest by c, and i can only win when i 's payment is the largest by at least c for any history for whichμ i < µ i .
is is a violation to fairness for δ < 1 4 . Notice that Equation 1 implies that each arm receives the highest payment with probability 1 k , and that this also holds conditioning on any gap c between highest and second-highest payments. Now, since D is not peaked,
De ne c as follows:
Notice, this implies that:
We now construct an instance as a function of c. ere are two cases -either c > 0 or c = 0.
Case 1: c > 0. Consider the following instance, de ned in terms of c and a constant 0 < ϵ < c: arm 1 has mean 1 − c with deterministic rewards, arm 2 has mean 1 − c with reward 1 − c − ϵ with probability 1 2 and reward 1 − c + ϵ with probability 1 2 , and arms 3, . . . , k have a deterministic reward of 1. Note that by de nition of c, and the deterministic nature of arm 1's distribution, we have that for every history h, π t 1|h ≥ 1/k. By the fairness constraint, we must therefore also have that for every other arm i > 1, π t i |h ≥ 1/k, since no other arm has lower mean. is implies that for every arm i, it must be that π t i |h = 1/k. Note, as we argued in footnote 7, that with probability at least 1 4 , for any t,μ 2 <μ 1 = 1−c, by construction. In this case, there is some ϵ > 0 such that arm 2 is not played unless p 2 > max i 2 p i +c +ϵ . However, by de nition of c, this occurs with probability strictly less than 1/k, contradicting the assertion that D is a fair distribution.
Case 2: c = 0. Consider the instance in which arms 1, . . . , k − 1 have mean 1 2 and deterministic reward distributions, while arm k has mean 1/2, and stochastic rewards that are 1 2 − ϵ with probability 1 2 and 1 2 + ϵ with probability 1 2 . Note that in this case, fairness requires that all arms be played with identical probabilities. With probability at least 1 4 , arm k has empirical mean lower than its true mean. Condition onμ k < µ k . In this case, since c = 0, with arm k must be selected with probability less than 1 k since the payment to arm k will be strictly less than µ k −μ k with strictly positive probability (2), and therefore unfair.
A Fair Payment Scheme for Two Arms
We now show that having at least three arms is necessary for our lower bound result. Indeed, in the classic stochastic partial information se ing with two arms there exists a simple payment scheme that can ensure fairness in every round while achieving sublinear regret and payment.
e key idea in this payment scheme is to maintain con dence intervals around empirical reward means for the two arms. e following lemma tells us how to construct con dence intervals. 7 For t odd it is 1 2 , for even t it is 1 2 1 − · t t /2 · 1 2 t ≥ 1 4 , achieved at t = 2 and increasing in t . 
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In the light of this result, we will de ne the function C W as follows, which will also be useful for describing our payment scheme in the following section.
Given this con dence width function, our payment scheme is the following: in each round t, choose an arm a t uniformly at random, and o er payment p(δ, t, n t 1 , n t 2 ) for playing arm a t and o er 0 for playing the other arm, where p(δ, t, n t 1 , n t 2 ) = C W (δ, t, n t 1 ) + C W (δ, t, n t 2 ) and n t 1 , n t 2 denote the number of times that the two arms are played before round t. Whenever the agent selects the arm associated with zero payment, the principal will then o er zero payment for both arms in all future rounds. T 3.5. Consider the classic case with k = 2 arms in the partial information se ing. en the payment scheme above instantiated with parameter δ is fair in every round with probability at least 1 − δ . Moreover, the incurred total cost and expected regret are at mostÕ ( √ T ).
CLASSIC SETTING: SUBLINEAR PAYMENTS WITH ONLYÕ (K 2 ) UNFAIR ROUNDS
e necessity of linear growth in subsidies ( eorem 3.1) was driven by the requirement that the agent satisfy contextual fairness in each period. It is natural to ask what would happen if one relaxed this requirement. In this section, we describe how to design a payment scheme which will satisfy contextual fairness in all butÕ (k 2 ) rounds. We show that it is possible to achieve payments and regret which grow sub-linearly with T . e rough idea behind this upper bound is inspired by Joseph et al. [8] who show that fairness can be achieved by maintaining con dence intervals around empirical arm means, and enforcing the constraint that any pair of arms with overlapping con dence intervals are played with equal probability: in particular, a fair no-regret algorithm can play uniformly at random amongst the set of arms "chained" to the arm with highest upper con dence bound by the con dence intervals, called the chained set X .
Denote the con dence interval associated with arm i at round t by [ t i , u t i ]. Fix a set of con dence intervals at round t,
∅, and i is chained to j if i and j are in the same component of the transitive closure of the linked relation. We refer to the set of arms chained to the arm with highest upper con dence bound as the chained set X . We say the sequence of con dence intervals are valid if, with probability 1 − δ , they contain the true and empirical averages of every arm in every round.
In the absence of explicit knowledge of the sample means, the principal does not have su cient information to incentivize uniformly random play amongst exactly the set of arms chained to the arm with highest upper con dence bound X 8 . e principal does not know the empirical means of the arms, and therefore cannot compute the arms contained in X directly. e principal can, however, incentivize the myopic agent to play an arm j with a payment vector p t such that p t j ≥ max i p t i + | max iμ t i −μ t j |. Unfortunately, the principal neither knows which arms belong to X , nor how many arms are in X , nor how far apart the empirical means are in X . Instead, the principal can maintain upper bounds on all of these quantities. Namely, the principal tracks a superset of the chained set X , called the active setX . |X | will then act as an upper bound on the size of the chained set, and |X | · xX will upper bound the di erence between the highest arm mean and the lowest chained arm's means, where xX is the width of the largest con dence interval of any arm inX . By o ering a payment of |X | · xX to an arm selected uniformly fromX (and zero for all other arms), the principal will cause uniformly random play amongstX if all arms inX have empirical means within |X | · xX of the best empirical mean. is is fair if in every roundX = X : all means will then be within |X | · xX by the de nition of chaining and xX , and so this will induce uniformly random play amongst the chained set, exactly the behavior shown to be fair in Joseph et al. [8] . On the other hand, ifX \ X ∅, this behavior could be unfair, either because not all arms withinX have empirical means within |X | · xX of one another (i.e., not all arms in the set are chained together), or because some arms inX chain to other arms outside ofX , or because some arms inX are "below" arms outside ofX . We will guarantee the la er issues do not occur, by always ensuringX contains any arms "above" or chained to any arm inX . e former issue (that some arms inX may not be chained to others inX , and their empirical means may then not be close enough for the payment to change the myopic agent's behavior in all cases) cannot be entirely avoided. However, we can quickly discover if any arm inX has empirical mean less than |X | · xX below the best empirical mean: in O (X ) =Õ (k ) rounds, that arm will be o ered the subsidy and it won't change the agent's decision. oseÕ (k ) rounds will be unfair, as are several rounds which follow this discovery and update the setX . e following lemma, a generalization of the analysis of Joseph et al. [8] , can be interpreted to mean the following. Fix a de niton of con dence intervals which are all valid over all rounds for all arms with probability 1 − δ . Consider any set of arms S which (a) contains the "upper chain" (all arms chained to the arm with highest upper con dence bound), (b) contains any arms "above" the con dence intervals of any arm in the set, and (c) is closed under chaining. en, playing uniformly at random amongst S will satisfy contextual fairness. 
. Consider a set S of arms with the k highest upper con dence bounds for some k < k. en, it is fair to play uniformly at random over S ∪ {i chained to an arm in S }. e pseudo-code in Figure 1 describes the payment scheme, which we analyze therea er. e performance of this payment scheme is summarized in the following theorem. 
We present the proof to this theorem a er stating several lemmas describing the behavior of P A . Observation 2 states that using x as a con dence interval width for all arms inX yields valid con dence intervals. Herea er, we use [ t i , u t i ] = [μ t i − x,μ t i + x] as valid con dence intervals for all i ∈X , t ∈ [T ]. Lemma 4.3 shows that F C outputs a set which contains the upper con dence chain in its output round. Lemma 4.4 states that F C 's output is closed under chaining (e.g., that every arm in its output is only chained to arms also belonging to the output set) and contains all arms "above" any arms in its output. Lemma 4.5 argues that the empirical means of every arm in the set output by F C are within 4 con dence interval widths of some other arm in the set. 
O er p t = p t −1 + 2 · x · i ∈X \R e i ; // add 2 · x to payments of arms inX not yet chosen end return R are within 4x of each other, as is the case right a er a call to F C ), that C F induces uniformly random play amongstX . Lemma 4.7 upper-bounds the number of rounds before which C F will discover when it is inducing unfair play. All proofs of these lemmas can be found in the full version of this paper. Moreover, max j ∈Rμ Whenever there is an arm i such that max j ∈X |μ t j −μ t i | > 4|X | · x, with probability 1 − δ , F C will be called within O (k · ln(1/δ )) many rounds.
P T 4.2. We rst upper-bound the number of rounds in which P A might violate the fairness condition.
We argue iteratively about the setX : that (a) all arms chained to the top arm belong toX , and (b) all arms chained to any arm inX belong toX . is is trivially true initially asX = {1, . . . , k}. X is only updated as the result of a call to F C . By Lemma 4.3, any arm chained to the top arm will remain inX . Furthermore, by Lemma 4.4, any arm chained to an arm in its output also belongs to its output. us, (a) and (b) hold forX for all rounds. Session 5b: Information Games EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA So, in rounds in which C F induces uniformly random play fromX , (a) and (b) imply C F satis es the fairness condition. For any round in which max i, j ∈X |μ t i −μ t j | ≤ 2|X | · x, Lemma 4.6 implies C F induces uniformly random play fromX . By Lemma 4.4,X contains any arms either above or chained to arms inX . us, Lemma 4.1 applies and these rounds are fair.
We now upper-bound the number of rounds for which C F does not induce uniformly random play amongstX . For any particular i and round t such that max j ∈X |μ t j −μ t i | > 4|X | · x, Lemma 4.7 implies that this will be found in O (k ln(1/δ )) rounds, and F C will be called. In any future round t ≥ t, since the con dence intervals are valid, we know that max j ∈X |μ t j −μ t i | > 4(|X | − 2) · x, since either of the two means can change but by at most x each. Lemma 4.5 will returnX such that max i, j ∈X |μ t i −μ t j | ≤ (2|X | + 2) · x. us, as |X | ≥ 2, then arm i will be removed at the rst round in which it was the impetus for F C to be called
x is non-increasing, so isX : thus, at most k calls to F C are made. us, the total number of unfair rounds is equal to the number of rounds in which max i, j ∈X |μ t i −μ t j | > 4|X | ·x plus the number of rounds in F C . e former is bounded by O (k 2 ln(k/δ )) (With probability 1 − δ /k it will take at most O (k ln(k/δ )) rounds of unfair play before F C is called when this is the case, and each call will reduce the size ofX so it can be called at most k times. In total, this bound holds for all k rounds with probability 1 − δ .); the la er by O (k 2 ) (each call of F C uses O (k ) rounds, and there are at most O (k ) calls to F C ). We now upper-bound the cost of this payment scheme and the regret of the agent. In the O (k 2 ln(k/δ )) unfair rounds, the payments might be Ω(1); similarly, the regret of the algorithm in those rounds might be Ω (1) . In all other rounds, the myopic agent is playing uniformly at random amongst a set of arms whose true means are within 2k · x of the best true mean, so 2k · x in each fair round is an upper-bound on per-round regret. e maximum payment o ered in any round is 4k · x as well, so that also upper bounds the cost. e overall upper bound follows from some basic algebra and the fact that each arm inX will have been playedΩ t k times in round t.
CONTEXTUAL SETTING WITH PARTIAL INFORMATION: LINEAR PAYMENTS OR UNFAIR ROUNDS
In this section, we argue that the partial information model is much harder in the linear contextual case -in every round that the principal does not pay Ω(1), an adversary can force the myopic agent to behave unfairly. is implies that on an adversarially chosen instance, every round is either unfair or has constant cost: thus, either the sum of the payments must be Ω(T ), or the number of unfair rounds must be Ω(T ), or both. is rules out positive results in the partial information model of the sort we were able to obtain in the classic bandits se ing. In the following, we assume that the myopic agent is using an ordinary least squares estimator, for simplicity. Identical results can also be proven for other natural estimators, like ridge regression estimators.
Consider any payment scheme in the partial information model in the linear contextual bandit se ing. For any η ∈ (0, 1), there is an instance for which with probability 1 − δ , in every round, either the round is unfair, or the expected cost for the principal is k −1 k · (1 − η).
e proof of the theorem relies on the fact that the principal cannot observe the adversarially chosen contexts; the expected rewards in any round then can be (almost) arbitrary. In the classic case, it was only in the rst unpeaked round that we had the freedom to design our lower bound instance arbitrarily -a er that, the principal would have learned some information about the instance, and hence the payment distribution could be a function of the instance. In the linear contextual case, we have su cient freedom to design a lower bound instance at -every-round. Although the principal may have learned a great deal about the underlying linear functions, she by de nition has no information about the realized contexts at the current round, which we use to our advantage. As in the classic se ing, in any round where the payment scheme is not peaked, the largest payment is strictly less than 1 larger than the other payments with probability more than zero. We will use this to construct an instance over which there is constant probability (over the history) that the myopic agent chooses an unfair distribution over arms. Additional complications arise from the fact that the principal learns about the instance from the set of previous unfair rounds (which, in the classic case, we did not have, since we only argued there had to be a single unfair round if the payment scheme was not peaked). We circumvent this problem by arguing that the principal must deploy a peaked distribution to be fair, even if the principal knows everything about the instance I and even if the principal knows the empirical estimatesθ t i for all t ∈ [T ], i ∈ [k].
P . Consider the one-dimensional case, where θ i ∈ R ≥0 . We construct an instance I such that even for a principal who has full information about I , andθ t i for all t ≤ t, i, in order to guarantee that the payment distribution in round t is fair for any set of arriving contexts x t , the largest payment must be at least 1 − η with probability k −1 k . is clearly holds for any round in which a peaked payment distribution is used, and so for the remainder, we assume that the distribution in round t is not peaked.
Let θ i = 1−η ∈ (0, 1) for all i, and let arm 1 have deterministic rewards equal to their mean, so that θ 1 x t 1 = x t 1 for all t. As the rewards are deterministic and the agent is using an ordinary least squares estimator, the myopic agent's predictionθ t 1 = θ t 1 as well for all t.
: the rewards drawn from these distributions have the right expectation but are always larger or smaller than their expectation, and each with equal probability. en, again by properties of the ordinary least squares estimator, this will imply that with probability 1 2 over observations, in any round t and for any i ∈ [k] \ {1},θ t i > θ t i , and with probability 1 2 ,θ t i < θ t i , for any round t. Furthermore, with probability 1, in every round t, every empirical estimate of the coe cients is distinct:θ t i θt j for all i j ∈ [k]. We begin by arguing that every coordinate i must have equal probability of receiving the largest payment in any round t if the round is to be fair (with probability 1 − δ over the history). Precisely,
x some history h t , and let
Since for all i ∈ [k] and any h t , θ i · x t i = 0, it must be that d i = 1 k for all i if round t is fair for this h t . We have assumed the payment scheme is not peaked in round t, conditioned on h t . us,
We argue round t must be unfair conditioned on h t , or with probability k −1
we again know that some such c ≥ 0 must exist, and that c < 1 because the payment scheme is unpeaked. Let arm i have the largest empirical coe cient:θ t Session 5b: Information Games EC'17, June 26-30, 2017, Cambridge, MA, USA e.g. that c i is the margin by which i has payment larger than arm i when i has largest payment. Note c i ∈ [0, 1] for all i . Let i max ∈ arg max i c i be an arm with largest payment margin over i and i min = argmin i c i be the arm with the smallest payment margin over i. We consider three cases: when c i max > 1 − η, when 1 − η ≥ c i max > c i min , and when 1 − η ≥ c i max = c i min . In each case, we show that either the largest payment is at least 1 − η with probability at least k −1 k , or the round is unfair.
We claim here that either c i min > 1 − η or the round is unfair: this will imply that with probability k−1 k , max i p i ≥ 1 − η. Suppose the round is fair. Consider the context
for all other i. Fairness will imply that all i 1 should be played with equal probability. Notice that i max is played with probability 1 k : precisely when i max has the largest payment (which must be largest by c i max > 1 − η). i min wins only when her payment is largest (which happens with probability 1 k ) and larger than i's by at least 1 − η. So, if π t i min |h t = π t i max |h t = 1 k , it must be that c i min ≥ 1 − η.
We argue that the round must be unfair if c i max > c i min .
Choose contexts x t i such thatθ t i x t i = c i max ≤ 1 − η and x t i = 0 for all other i . en, since θ i x t i = 0 for all i i, if this round is to be fair, all arms i i must be played with equal probability. Arm i max wins whenever it has the largest payment, since p i max ≥ p i + c i max whenever i max has the largest payment. erefore i max wins with probability 1 k . i min , on the other hand, wins only when they have the largest payment and beat i's payment by c i max > c i min , which happens with strictly less probability than i min having largest payment (probability 1 k ) by the de nition of c i min . So, i min wins with probability strictly less than that of i max ; this round must be unfair.
Case 3: 1 − η ≥ c i max = c i min . In this case, c a = c b = β for all a, b ∈ [k] \ {i}. If β ≥ 1 − η, the claim holds (the largest payment is at least 1 − η with probability at least k −1 k , so assume β < 1 − η. Suppose β > 0. We exhibit a set of contexts for which this payment scheme combined with the agent is unfair. Fix some D ∈ (β, 1 − η); de ne the contexts
en,θ t i x t i <θ t j x t j , and so arm j is played whenever j has the largest payment, since j (and all other arms) has margin over i of at least β when they have the largest payment; thus j is played with probability 1 k . Since θ j x t j = θ i x t i for all i i, if this round is fair, each i must also be played with probability 1 k , in particular for i with smallestθ t i . However,θ t i x t i < D − β; i can only win if her payment is the largest and it beats the payment of i by strictly more than β, which happens with probability strictly less than 1 k by de nition of β. us i cannot win with probability as large as j and so round t is unfair if c a = c b = β > 0 for all a, b i.
Finally, we consider the case where β = 0 and separately argue that this round cannot be fair. e contexts x t i = 1 for all i should prove this: arm i will be played with probability 1 k (precisely the probability that i gets the weakly largest payment), but arms with smaller empirical means will need to have the largest payment by some margin, which happens with strictly less probability than them having the largest payment by the de nition of β, so they win with probability less than 1 k , meaning fairness is violated in this round, since θ i x t i = 1 − η = θ i x t i .
FULL INFORMATION: PERFECT FAIRNESS WITH SUBLINEAR PAYMENTS
In this section, we show that a principal with full information about the state of a myopic agent can design a payment scheme which is fair in every round and has sublinear cost for both the classic and linear contextual bandits problems. is contrasts with the partial information model, where for k ≥ 3 arms, in both the classic and linear contextual se ings, in which there must be unfair rounds for any payment scheme with total cost o(T ). Roughly, the fair payment scheme operates as follows. In each round, the scheme knows the empirical estimates of rewards used by the myopic agent. Moreover, the scheme can compute con dence intervals around these estimates (the scheme knows how many times each arm was pulled, and, in a contextual se ing, the contexts for each previous choice). In such a round, the payment scheme then will choose an arm i uniformly at random from the set of arms chained to the arm with highest upper con dence bound, and o er a payment for choosing i equal to the di erence between the empirical estimate of i's reward and the empirical estimate of the highest reward in that round. is induces uniformly random play amongst the top set of arms, and by Lemma 4.1, this will be a fair distribution.
We now present the pseudocode in Figure 2 a parametrized family of payment schemes described informally above. A payment scheme in this family is instantiated by giving a method of constructing valid con dence intervals around myopic predictions.
ALGORITHM 2: A Fair Full Information Payment Scheme
Function Fair-Payments(δ,T ) X ← {1, . . . , k }; while t ≤ T do i t = arg max iμ t i t ; LetX t = {i chained to i t by δ -valid con dence intervals from round t }; Choose j t ∈ UARX ;
// Pick an arm in the upper chain to incentivize O er p t : p t j t =μ t i t −μ t j t , p t i j t = 0; end T 6.1. Consider an instance of Fair-Payments(δ,T ) instantiated with con dence intervals [ t i , u t i ] such thatμ t i = u t i − t i 2 , and with probability 1 − δ , for all i ∈ [k], t ∈ [T ], µ t i ∈ [ t i , u t i ]. en, Fair-Payments(δ,T ) is fair at every round, and has cost and regret O (k t w (t ) + δT ), where w (t ) is the maximum width of any con dence interval in the top chained set.
Before proving eorem 6.1, we mention that this theorem, when combined with standard methods of constructing con dence intervals, implies the existence of fair payment schemes with sublinear cost and regret, both in the classic and linear contextual se ings. C 6.2. Consider the classic bandits problem. en, Fair-Payments(δ,T ) using the condence interval for arm i introduced by C W (δ,T , n t i ) is fair and has cost and regret O ( k 3 T ln kT δ ). P . By Lemma 3.4, with probability 1 − δ , these con dence intervals are all valid for all t ∈ [T ], i ∈ [k]. So, eorem 6.1 applies, and states that this payment scheme is fair, and has regret O (k · t w (t )), where w (t ) is the maximum width of any arm in the active set at round t. Since the chained set is monotone, at round t every arm in the chained set has been chained for t rounds. erefore, in expectation each arm in the chain has been pulled t k times. An additive Cherno bound implies that any particular arm has, with probability at least 1 − δ 2kt 2 , been pulled in round t at least t k − t ln 2t 2 k δ 2 times, and so this bound holds for all rounds and all arms with probability at lest 1 − δ 2 summing up over all k arms and all t. en, by Lemma 3 in Joseph et al. [8] , we know that w (t ) ≤ 2 ln((π t ) 2 /3δ )
. Summing over all t we have the desired result. C 6.3. Consider the linear contextual bandits problem. Suppose the myopic agent uses a ridge regression estimator:θ t i = X T i X i + λI −1 X T i Y i , where X i , Y i are the design matrices and observations before round t. en, de ne P . e analysis in the proof of eorem 2 of Joseph et al. [7] shows that these con dence intervals are valid with probability 1 − δ . eir analysis upper-bounds k t w (t ) where w (t ) is the largest width of any con dence interval in the chained set in round t, by O md √ k 3 T ln 2 T 2 k dλδ .
us, the resulting algorithm is fair, and the bounds on cost and regret follow from eorem 6.1.
We now proceed with the proof of eorem 6.1. P . We begin by proving that Fair-Payments(δ,T ) is fair in every round. By assumption, with probability 1 − δ , for all i ∈ [k], t ∈ [T ], µ t i ∈ [ t i , u t i ]. us it follows from Lemma 4.1 that it su ces to show that these payments su ce to induce uniformly random play amongst the set of arms chained to the arm with upper con dence bound. By de nition, the top chain in round t is exactlyX t . e distribution over payments in round t chooses each j t ∈X t with probability 1 |X t | and accordingly a p t such that p t j t =μ t i t −μ t j t and p t i = 0. is induces the myopic agent to choose j t in all such cases. us, each j t ∈X t is chosen by the myopic agent with probability 1 |X t | . So, Fair-Payments(δ,T ) is fair.
Condition on all con dence intervals being valid. e myopic agent under this payment scheme chooses uniformly at random from the top chain, which has regret in round t bounded by i ∈X t u t i − t i ≤ kw (t ), where w (t ) = max i ∈X t u t i − t i . us, in total, the regret is upper bounded by k t w (t ). Moreover, the payment in round t isμ t i t −μ t j t ≤ u t i t − t j t ≤ i ∈X t u t i − t i ≤ kw (t ), and so the same bound holds for the cost of the payment scheme. With probability δ , the widths of the con dence intervals could be arbitrary, as could the inaccuracy of the sampled means. An additive δT bounds the additional expected regret.
